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Decriminalization of Violence in the Home:
Mediation in Wife Battering Cases
Dianna R. Stallone*
If a man assaulted a pregnant friend of yours on the street
and beat her until he broke her jaw, punched her repeatedly in the stomach, broke two of her ribs . ..who would
you call? A psychiatrist, or a cop?1
The common sense response to this question would be "A
cop, of course." Most people would agree this violence is criminal behavior. Ironically, this behavior, when it occurs in a family setting, is considered "normal," "necessary" and
"justifiable." Suddenly, the response to this violence is no
longer 'Trhrow that guy in jail." Instead, the response is "Mind
your own business. This is a family matter."2 Society conveniently denies that criminal behavior exists in the family setting. Years of tradition, social conditioning and economic
selfishness buttress our refusal to address family violence
through the criminal system.
Reports of violence within family units has been collected
and recorded in broad-based data since the mid-1970s. According to current estimates, approximately two million women in
the United States are battered annually. 3 Researchers have

found that the risk of serious assault, physical injury, and murder is greatest in one's own home. Furthermore, the perpetrator of the crime is often a family member.4
* Dianna R. Stallone is a graduate of William Mitchell College of Law.
From June, 1982 until August, 1983, Ms. Stallone worked with battered women
at the Minneapolis City Attorney's office, which houses the city's mediation
program. She explained the criminal process to battered women, assisted with
prosecution of abusers, and facilitated meetings between battered women and
judicial personnel
1. Louise Armstrong, The Home Front: Notes from the Family War Zone 1
(1983).
2. Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women's Movement 225 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 59-67.
3. Schechter, supra note 2, at 16.
4. Murray Straus, Richard Gelles & Suzanne Steinmetz, Behind Closed
Doors: Violence in the American Family 4 (1980). One study showed that 40%
of female homicide victims are killed by family members. Lisa Lerman, Prosecution of Spouse Abuse: Innovations in Criminal Justice Response 1 (1981).
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Despite overwhelming data about family violence, the
criminal system has generally avoided the problem. 5 Rather
than prosecute batterers, the criminal system diverts family
disputes from the criminal system to informal mediation programs.6 Recently, battered women's advocates have questioned the efficacy of mediation and the motives behind its use.
In this article, I evaluate the use of mediation in wife 7 abuse
cases.
To evaluate mediation programs, we must choose appropriate evaluative criteria. Evaluators often use criteria or standards found in other programs to judge mediation. The efficacy
of mediation programs, for example, is often compared with the
efficacy of other existing alternatives such as the criminal system. Such a comparison distorts the value of mediation programs. As a practical matter, the criminal system avoids wife
abuse cases. 8 The very existence of diversion programs demonstrates that wife abuse cases are excluded from the criminal
system. The same biases that engendered the diversion programs also affect those cases which go through the criminal
system.9 Compared to a system that simply ignores wife battering, mediation programs look better than they are.
To examine this distortion, I first focus my analysis on the
perceived causes of battering. I then examine the goals and
methods of mediation programs. I conclude that mediation is
but another way that the criminal system avoids confronting
the pervasive violence in the family institution. Mediation is
not only ineffective in stopping battering, but also tends to aggravate the conditions that promote battering. Finally, I discuss suggestions for reform, based on the causes of battering,
which would more effectively serve the needs of battered
women.
5. Throughout this article I refer to the criminal justice system as the criminal system. For an extensive review of the criminal system's response to battering, see generally, R. Emerson Dobash & Russell Dobash, Violence Against
Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy 207-22 (1979).
6. Lerman, supra note 4, at 66.
7. Throughout this paper, I will use the words "husband," "wife," and
"spouse" to include not only those persons in a marital relationship but also
those in other intimate relationships.
8. See generally Dobash & Dobash, supra note 5; Lisa Lerman, Mediation
of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 65-67 (1984).
9. Schechter, supra note 2, at 24-27, 54-55.

19841
I.

WIFE BATTERING MEDIATION

Battering-An Analysis of the Causes

Various studies explore the reasons why husbands batter
their wives.10 I begin this evaluation with a representative survey of theories about the causes of battering. My goal in this
analysis is not to explain battering in a single theory, but
rather to separate the theories which have been widely discredited from those which have not. After making this separation, I
examine the mediation approach to family violence. To the extent that mediation implicitly incorporates the discredited sexist theories in either its goals or implementation, mediation of
family violence must also be discredited.
A.

Victim Blaming Theories

Masochist, provocation, and conflict theories are examples
of victim blaming theories. These theories focus on the victim's
behavior rather than on the behavior of the violent party. They
also justify violence on the basis of the victim's own behavior.
Some theorists argue that domestic abuse victims are
masochistic." These theorists focus on the reasons that a wife
stays with an abusive husband. They first note that the abusive
husband has previously attacked the victim in over ninety percent of domestic violence cases. 12 Masochist theorists then
draw the conclusion from this data that the abused woman
must enjoy such beatings or else she would not put up with
them.' 3 The masochist theory claims that the wife who stays
with an abusive husband has a masochistic need that her husband's aggression fulfills.14 As one such theorist explains:
The essential ingredient seems to us to be the need both
the husband and wife feel for periodic reversal of roles; she
to be punished for her castrating activity, he to re-establish
his masculine identity.15
The masochist theory, however, ignores the terror and eco10. For an overview, see Straus, supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., John Snell, Richard Rosenwald & Ames Roby, The Wife-Beater's
Wife: A Study of Family Interaction, Archives of General Psychiatry 11 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as The Wifebeater's Wife].
12. Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota Program for Battered
Women, 1981 Update 41 (1981) (data on prior abuse).
13. For example, a counseling psychologist from Columbia, South Carolina
was quoted as saying- "probably some wives want to be beaten. For some it

may be the only attention they get." Roger Langley &Richard Levy, Wifebeating- The Silent Crisis 113 (1977).
14. The Wifebeater's Wife, supra note 11, at 109.
15. Id. quoted in Schechter, supra note 2 at 22; Anthony Storr, Human Aggression 95 (1974).
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nomic coercion battered women face. The theory fails to consider the historical tradition that sanctions the husband's right
to beat and reprimand his wife.' 6 In addition, the theory takes
no notice of the violent husband's superior economic and physical power.17 Nor does the theory recognize the victim's fear of
retaliation should she leave the batterer.18
Equally disturbing is that masochist theories justify beatings by blaming them on the woman's perceived threat to male
sexuality and masculinity. If "castrating" behavior is a justification for violence, any woman can be beaten any time she
challenges a man's superiority. Furthermore, the violent party
determines what constitutes "castrating" behavior. The masochist theory scrutinizes the victim rather than the assailant,
and blames the assailant's violent behavior on the victim's psychological need to be abused.
Even assuming that the victim does desire abuse, the violent partner still must make choices about his own behavior.
The "woman as masochist" paradigm provides a convenient
way for the assailant to transfer to the victim responsibility for
his own behavior.1 9 From this perspective, violence constitutes
the normal and healthy state of affairs in the marital relationship. The victim wants to be abused and the assailant wants to
reassert his masculinity. According to the masochist theory, violence makes for the happy ending-both get what they want.
Closely aligned with the masochist theory are the "provocation" and "conflict" theories. 20 These views represent another branch of the victim blaming analysis. The provocation/
conflict theories argue that battering correlates with increasing
conflict. 21 One author argues that the husband is violent because he loses control when he can no longer resist his wife's
16. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered
Women and the Administration of Justice (Jan. 1982) (hereinafter cited as
Under the Rule of Thumb].
17. For an historical overview of women's work and women's dismal economic position both in and outside family units, see Alice Kessler-Hamris, Women Have Always Worked (1981).
18. One study showed that all battered women believed that their husbands
could kill them. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman XV (1979).
19. One author who studied the characteristics of assaulters found that assaulters share certain characteristics. One of these characteristics is the externalization of blame. Assaulters try to reduce their feelings of guilt by
rationalizing their actions and blaming the victim. Barbara Star, Characteristics of Family Violence, in The Many Faces of Family Violence 18 (Jerry
Flanzer ed. 1982); Dobash, supra note 5, at 118.
20. See generally The Wifebeater's Wife, supra note 11.
21. Straus, supra note 4, at 161.
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provocative, antagonistic behavior.2 2 This argument raises but
leaves unanswered at least two questions: What constitutes
provocative, antagonistic behavior? What causes the husband
to respond to this behavior with violence? Consider whether
refusal to perform housekeeping chores constitutes provocative
behavior. American couples report that a disagreement related
to housekeeping is one of the most frequent conflicts that precede a violent attack. 23 A disagreement over dirty dishes or a
late dinner may precede assaultive behavior but it is probably
inaccurate to characterize such squabbles as provoking or causing assaultive behavior which sends thousands of women to
hospitals each year. Presumably, the batterer experiences conflict in the workplace, but does not respond to that conflict with
violence. Only in the privacy of his home does the batterer feel
free to act out his frustration in a violent way.
The provocation and conflict theories have disturbing implications. The theories label the wife "provocative" whenever
she challenges her husband's absolute right to control her. Labeling the wife's behavior as provocative also justifies the husband's beating his wife back into submission. In addition to
these disturbing implications, the provocation theory fails to
24
explain why some women are battered in their sleep. These
theories share the weaknesses of the masochist theory. All victim blaming theories nourish the assailant's need to externalize
blame and legitimize shifting to the battered woman the responsibility for the violent act.
B.

Psychological Theories

Some theorists explain battering as psychotic behavior.
Such explanations have been contradicted by studies which
show that most batterers do not have symptoms or problems
normally exhibited by mentally ill people or those having personality disorders.2 5 Nor does any evidence demonstrate that
22. M. Faulk, Men Who Assault Their Wives, in Battered Women: A Psychological Study of Domestic Violence 121-24 (Maria Roy ed. 1977).
23. Straus, supra note 4, at 157. Straus also notes, however, that 34% of all
American couples say they always disagree about housekeeping issues. Id.
24. Interviews with battered women in Minneapolis, Minnesota (June, 1982August, 1983).
25. Straus, supra note 4, at 125. Armstrong denounces the use of "psychological autopsies on living victims." She argues that evidence shows that wifebatterers are normal. She notes that historically men have given themselves
permission to be violent. The result of this tradition is that husbands are violent, not in spite of the fact that they know it is wrong, but rather, because they
believe it is right or at least justifiable. Armstrong, supra note 1,at 6-7.
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most victims are mentally or physically ill. Batterers and battered women comprise a diverse sociological group encompassing all economic backgrounds, ethnic groups and personality
types. 26
The catharsis theory is typical of some psychologists' attempts to label battering as a mental illness afflicting either the
husband or the wife.27 The catharsis theory implies that violent marital conflict is inevitable. Advocates of the theory hypothesize that people have an innate aggressive drive they
must express. When non-violent avenues of expression do not
exist, the person suffers from accumulated aggression which
eventually erupts into violence.28 Other theorists argue that
battering results from poor impulse control. These theorists
speculate that the husband is simply unable to control his violence. 29 According to these theorists, batterers should be
taught to express their aggression verbally or to strike an inanimate object.30
The "poor impulse control" and catharsis theories contain,
at least, two flaws. First, there is little, if any, scientific evidence to support either the theories or the treatment. 31 To the
contrary, evidence shows that when a man ventilates his anger
through verbal abuse or by striking an object, he is more likely
to continue his violent behavior. 32 Thus, the suggested therapy
does not reduce the violent drive. Second, neither theory explains why some husbands are "sophisticated" batterers. "Sophisticated" batterers consciously hit their wives only where
others will not readily notice the bruises or scars.33 If a husband actually "loses control" when he strikes his wife, as the
theories suggest, he would probably not be able to limit his violence. He certainly would not consider hiding the evidence of
his violence. Additionally, many husbands have greater physical strength and use weapons more frequently than their wives.
If husbands actually lose control when they strike their wives,
26. Straus, supra note 4, at 31.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Id. Following the reasoning of this theory, one might either predict a
similar percentage of male and female batterers, or a higher percentage of female batterers because men have greater access than women to outlets for aggression such as soldiering and competitive sports. Neither prediction,
however, is valid.
29. Star, supra note 19, at 16; Straus, supra note 4, at 167.
30. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 4, at 167.
31. Id. at 168.
32. Id.
33. Interview with Cheryl Howard, Representative of Domestic Abuse Project, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (October 10, 1983).
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more husbands would kill their wives than actually do. 34
These theories fail to consider the context in which husbands batter their wives. When husbands strike wives, they
conform to a behaviorial rule or norm. 35 The norm is that it is
acceptable to hit wives, but that it is unacceptable to kill
them.36 Batterers know that certain violence may result in serious reprisals and that other violence will go unchecked. Their
knowledge may also explain why batterers choose to beat their
wives and not others, such as their bosses, with whom they experience conflict.
One author who studied the characteristics of batterers
noted that they share, a tendency to shift anger. 37 Batterers
shift anger from those over whom they have no control to those
whom they can dominate. 38 This evidence supports the notion
that batterers do not suffer from poor impulse control, but
rather make conscious choices based upon an evaluation of
probable consequences. The underlying hypotheses of the catharsis and "poor impulse control" theories are both unsupported by evidence and insufficient to explain many battering
situations.
C. Socio-Economic Theories
Socio-economic theories which attempt to explain battering rely on certain sociological factors. The most frequently
cited factor is the generational aspect of family violence. 39 Theorists have determined that children who grow up in a violent
setting have a strong tendency to be violent themselves when
they grow older. Extrapolating from such data, some theorists
claim violent childhood experiences cause battering. 4o I call
this hypothesis the generational theory of battering.
Children experience different degrees of violence. Some
children, for example, experience physical acts such as spanking. These children learn that those who love them are the
ones that hit them. They also learn that violence can and
should be used to ensure conformity with behavioral norms.
They learn that violence is acceptable when other forms of per34. Straus, supra note 4, at 45-46.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Star, supra note 19, at 18.

38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Jerry Flanzer, Alcohol and Family Violence, in The Many
Faces of Family Violence 41 (Jerry Flanzer ed. 1982).
40. Straus, supra note 4, at 98-101.
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suasion do not work. In short, children learn to internalize and
believe in the moral rightness of violence. 41
In another way, children learn similar lessons when they
witness their father's violence toward their mother. Children
receive clear messages about the roles of husbands and wives.
Male children may identify with the aggressor and become violent.42 They may learn that violence is a handy control device.
Female children may react by withdrawing.43 Children do not
view violence just as untouched bystanders. These experiences
in the home teach children about the male dominated structure
that institutionalizes violence.44
The generational theory of family violence has also been
criticized. Experts caution against separating the generational
aspect of family violence from the societal traditions that condone abuse. They note that brothers from the same family will
often react to intra-familial violence differently. Some may
abuse and others may be repelled by violence. 45
Another possible explanation exists for the generational
aspect of wife abuse. What theorists assume to be a causal relation may merely reflect the high incidence of both violent
childhood experiences and wife abuse."6 Both kinds of abuse
are so pervasive that a substantial overlap of victims may be inevitable. The generational aspect of family violence may be a
significant factor causing battering, but it is only a part of the
social structure that condones the abuse of women and
children.
Theorists also cite many other socio-economic factors as
contributing to family violence. Among such factors are minority race, low family income, blue-collar employment, urban residence and unemployment. 47 Data demonstrating that poor
people and people of color do a greater proportion of the battering are biased. One bias, for example, results from the fact
that poor people and people of color are reported, caught and
prosecuted more often than white, upper-class offenders.4"
41. Id. at 102-04, 121, 124-25.
42. Langley & Levy, supra note 13, at 112.
43. Richard Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay?, 38 J. of Marr. & Fain.
659-668 (1976).
44. Schechter, supra note 2, at 215.
45. See, e.g. id. at 213.
46. See Nancy Erbe, Prostitutes: Victims of Men's Exploitation and Abuse,
2 Law & Inequality 609 (1984); The Proceedings of the International Tribunal on
Crimes Against Women (Diana Russell & Nicole Van de Ven eds. 1984).
47. Straus, supra note 4, at 131-51.
48. Mandatory arrest policies in domestic abuse cases may counter some of
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Even if it were demonstrably true that men of color were
the perpetrators of a disproportionate amount of violence
against women, the impact of racism on these men must be acknowledged. Some women of color have explained the violence
of men of color as a reaction to the vicious racism of white society. 49 They argue that the systematic, institutionalized degradation and dehumanization of men of color leads them to an
overwhelming sense of powerlessness. Men of color express
this powerlessness through violence towards those who are
even more powerless, namely, women of color and their
children. 50
This sociological explanation of battering may be accurate.
However, we must recognize that the explanation provides no
method to eliminate the violence. In fact, this explanation is
used to support a non-interventionist approach.5 1 Such an approach implies that since white society abuses men of color,
these men gain the right to abuse women with impunity. It is
disturbing that men of color may seek to remedy their oppression by aligning themselves with their oppressors, thereby increasing the burden on women of color. Although an
appreciation of possible differences between why men of color
batter and why white men batter is necessary to understand
woman abuse, this understanding should never condone or justify that abuse. The conclusion that non-intervention is appropriate because of discrimination against men of color tacitly
condones abuse of women.
Social scientists' studies are likewise inconclusive about
the relationships between crime (e.g. family violence) and unemployment. One criminologist, for example, concludes that
current research shows little relationship between economic
factors and crime. 52 Although some evidence may suggest that
this bias. In Duluth, Minnesota where a mandatory arrest policy in domestic
abuse cases was recently implemented, more whites and middle-class offenders
are being arrested than ever before. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Feb. 29,
1984 at BI, col. 1.
49. Interviews with battered women in Minneapolis, Minnesota (June, 1982August, 1983).
50. Telephone interview with Penny Scheffier, Coordinator of Family Violence Division of Indian Works, Minneapolis, Minnesota (Sept. 19, 1984). Scheffier notes that the racism of white society is one of many reasons why men of
color batter. She also notes, however, that this explanation should not absolve
men of color of responsibility for battering.
51. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
52. James Wilson, The Debate Over Deterrence: Thinking About Crime, Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1983, at 72-81. Wilson presents a symbiotic theory of criminality and unemployment. He argues that three relationships between
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socio-economic factors have a peripheral impact on battering,5 3
it is premature and inaccurate to conclude that such factors
cause battering.
D.

The InstitutionalizedPracticeof Violence Against
Women

Battered women's advocates have rejected victim blaming,
psychological and socio-economic theories. These advocates argue that dysfunctional relationships or psychological disabilities do not cause battering. They recognize battering as a
behavior that has been historically accepted. Susan Schechter
suggests that a holistic view of our social structure is the key to
understanding an individual man's violence against a particular
woman. Instead of focusing on why individuals batter, we
should focus on why men batter women.54 We need to distinguish between the question of why men are violent and the
55
question of why men are violent towards women.
Schechter argues that economic domination perpetuates
violence in the family.5 6 In our society, the economic status of
women is maintained at a level well below that of men. Women's subordinate economic status partially results from women's maintenance of the family and the home. Industrialized
society does not recognize the economic value of this work.
Women's economically unrewarded work in the home results in
women's economic dependence on men. Both women and men
are acutely aware of women's economic dependence. When the
husband's monetary support exceeds his wife's wages, her
work around the house is a fit subject for his inspection. If
housework is not done to the husband's satisfaction, it is
proper, and perhaps even his duty as head of the household, to
chastise and discipline her.57 Women's economic dependence
perpetuates the powerlessness of women to leave violent
relationships.5 8
Wives' solitary confinement in the home also reinforces
unemployment and criminality exist simultaneously: (1) unemployment leads

to crime; (2) crime leads to unemployment; and (3) social disintegration or personal inadequacy leads to both crime and unemployment.
53. See generally, id. passim.

54. Schechter, supra note 2 at 210.
55. Id. at 211.
56. Id. at 225.
57. Kathryn Conroy, Long Term Treatment Issues with Battered Women, in
The Many Faces of Family Violence 25 (Jerry Flanzer ed. 1982). See also supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
58. Schechter, supra note 2, at 224-25.
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their husbands' power over them. 59 The seclusion of women in
the family, combined with their historically inferior economic
position, allows society to ignore violence against women
within the family structure:
Because of the privatized family, and women's secondary
status within it, violence is viewed as an individual act.
Women suffer in shameful silence, convinced that no one
else is experiencing the horror and that no one else wants
to know about it. As a result, male domination is restored
in the family and in the community. Privatization is dangerous because it allows violence to accelerate while everyone says,60 'Mind your own business. This is a family
problem.'
The closed family structure resists external influence. Without
1
external influence, violence continues to flourish unchecked. 6
Studies show that abuse is most likely to escalate when the victim can be coerced into silence.6 2 The notion that "a man's
home is his castle" facilitates and legitimizes violence against
women. While the husband is protected from outside interference in his fortress, the wife is given an indeterminate sentence to a private torture chamber.
Another important aspect of our social structure that perpetuates battering is the belief that a man's wife is his property. This idea is embedded in the legal and moral traditions of
our society. Historically, the legal system regarded a husband
and wife as one person. That person was the man. The husband had every right to control his wife physically to keep her
behavior in line.6 3 Today, battering remains an effective tool

for the controlling husband. Even if the wife is not beaten repeatedly, a single violent act can teach her a profound lesson.
Battering powerfully demonstrates who is in control of the rela59. Compare Miriam Hirsch, Women and Violence 174 (1981) (negative
sanctions of social control correlate with observability).
60. Schechter, supra note 2, at 225.
61. Mark Krain, A Sociological Perspective on the Control of Violence in
Families,in The Many Faces of Family Violence 67 (Jerry Flanzer ed. 1982).
62.[All behavior is at least subject to evaluation by self and observers, in terms of roles and standards existing in culture and society,
which rate the acceptability of that behavior. ...
[Blehavior is
least likely to be controlled when the behaving person is the only
one who is aware of the behavior and the only one who decides
upon acceptability ....

[The violent behavior is] least likely to be

controlled when the victim can be compelled not to disclose the occurrence of violence.
Id. at 69.
63. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1509-11 (1983). See generally, Under the
Rule of Thumb, supra note 16; Lerman, supra note 4, at 15-16; R. Emerson
Dobash &Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives 60-61 (1979).
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tionship, and the consequences of challenging that control. 64

The notion of control has another important dimension. It
demonstrates that violence can be purposeful conduct-a result
of weighing alternatives, benefits, and perceived consequences.
Some scholars argue that violence is a tool that the husband
uses to get his own way in the relationship. 65 The husband discovers that a single act of violence can have a lasting effect.
The wife learns to placate the husband in order not to "provoke" him. The husband benefits because he does not have to
negotiate everyday household activities. In this way battering
is a "rational" choice.
This scenario profoundly affects the wife. She eventually
learns that she cannot identify the particular events which will
provoke her husband's violence. She eventually realizes that
she cannot in any way control her husband's violence. 66 One
researcher studied the effects of this realization and concluded
that the victim suffers from "learned helplessness."6 7 Once the
victim learns that she cannot control the infliction of pain
through her voluntary acts, she becomes completely passive.
Eventually, the victim accepts passivity as her reality. The victim's perception becomes so distorted that she does not recognize opportunities to escape when they arise.6 8
A discussion about the institutionalized causes of battering is not complete without recognizing the connection between the objectification of women in the media and the social
institutionalization of violence against women. 69 Commercial
70
advertising often portrays women as worthless and ignorant.
In addition, pornography is a potent contributor to the social
71
view that violence against women is erotic and acceptable.
Pornography's message to the male viewers is that men's use
64. Hirsch, supra note 59, at 174.
65. Id.; Dobash, supra note 5, at 127-133.

66. The wife's experience perhaps explains scholars' inability to identify
specific causes of an individual woman's abuse.
67. Walker, supra note 18, at 45-51.
68. Id.
69. Many battered women shelter advocates believe that pornography contributes to battering because their intake interviews reveal pornography is a
predominant hobby of batterers which has both taught men how to batter and
legitimized battery as sexual. Region XI Battered Women's Consortium, Pornography-A Battered Women's Issue (Feb./March 1984) at 10. See Dolf
Zillman & Jennings Bryant, Pornography,Sexual Callousness and the Trivialization of Rape, 32 J. of Coin. 10 (1981).
70. Department of Women's Studies, University of Minnesota, Images of

Women in Media and Pornography (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
71. Neil Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein, The Effects ofAggressive-Pornographic Mass Media Stimuli, 15 Adv. Exp. Soc. Psych. 103, 115 (1982).
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of violence against women is appropriate behavior. Pornography also portrays the submission of women to such force as
72
correspondingly appropriate behavior.
The causes of battering are complex. Simplistic views of
battering such as those offered by the provocation, masochist
and catharsis theories are inadequate. These theories are preserved because they serve a societal function; they shield some
people from the truth that they cannot always stop others from
being violent. When people accept this truth, they realize they
do not have control over their own lives. 73 The fear of being
hurt, engendered by this realization, compels people to distance themselves from abuse victims. 74 The provocation, masochist, and catharsis theories allow people to reason that if they
do not act foolishly and if they stay away from lunatics, they
will protect themselves from becoming victims.
We must resist the self-serving temptation to explain family violence as something peculiar to a particular victim or relationship. In reality, our social system first renders a woman
powerless and then uses that powerlessness as an excuse to
avoid protecting her. The lack of protection is based on the rationale that the woman deserves or wants to be abused because
she will not leave her abuser. We must look beyond this victim-oriented analysis to an understanding that violence against
women is institutionalized.
We must recognize that the family exists in a system that
institutionalizes the economic and sexual exploitation of women. A husband may beat his wife because he feels it is his
inalienable right to do so, or a husband may beat his wife because he has learned to feel violence as erotic. Spousal violence will not end until society stops protecting men who beat
up women. Any solution to the problem of family violence
must first address these institutionalized causes of battering.
II.

Mediation-A Description

The word "mediation" is often a source of confusion. Different types of actions and programs are labeled "mediation."
The spectrum ranges from a police officer's informal attempt to
reconcile parties on their doorstep to a formal procedure in
72. See Margaret Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality: The Minneapolis
Pornography Ordinance, 2 Law & Inequality 629 (1984).
73. Schechter, supra note 2, at 19-20.

74. Id.
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which parties draw up a contract.75 In this article, I limit my
analysis to the more formal approach.76 I define mediation as
meetings between a mediator and the parties involved, in
which the parties identify problems in their relationship and
reach an agreement on how to solve those problems.
Minneapolis, Minnesota has a formal mediation program
called the Citizens Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP).
CDSP operates out of the Minneapolis City Attorney's office,
and is typical of other mediation programs across the country.
In theory, the program exists as an alternative dispute resolution procedure for parties who do not want to go through the
criminal system. 77 In practice, the City Attorney's office sends
all victims of domestic abuse who attempt to prosecute their
husbands to CDSP. 78 CDSP then investigates which cases
should be mediated.
To determine whether a case is suitable for mediation
CDSP requires two factors. First, there must be a criminal offense that could be prosecuted. Second, the abuser must not be
violating a restraining order. 79 The CDSP also considers other
factors to evaluate the possible success of mediation. Among
these factors are the seriousness of the offense, a history of battering, and the abuser's chemical dependency.8 0 If the couple's
problems are not suited to mediation, the couple is sent to the
prosecutor's office. 8 1
If the couple is accepted for mediation, CDSP arranges a
meeting with a mediator. CDSP hires non-professional
75. Informal procedures are an alternative to mediation or full-scale prosecution. These procedures can include the police referring the victim to a shelter, informing the victim of her legal remedies, referring her to other resources,
or instructing the prosecutor to send a warning letter to the abuser. Lisa
Lerman reports that these informal measures are useful only where a pattern

of violence has not been solidified in a relationship. Lerman, supra note 4, at
64-65.
76. For an analysis of police officers' informal attempts to mediate between
batterers and victims, see Maria Pastoor, Police Training and the Effectiveness
of Minnesota "Domestic Abuse" Laws, 2 Law & Inequality 557 (1984).
77. Literature of the Minneapolis CDSP distributed by Minneapolis City Attorney's office on fle at the Law & Inequality Journal.
78. I observed this practice continually during my tenure as a legal intern at
the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office during 1982 and 1983.
79. Interview with Judith Jackson, Director of CDSP, in Minneapolis, Min-

nesota (Oct. 4, 1983).
80. CDSP does not uniformly apply the factors listed. Generally, abuse
cases resulting in serious injury are not mediated. CDSP did, however, mediate (unsuccessfully) a dispute involving a man who had broken his wife's leg.
Howard interview, supra note 33.
81. Jackson interview, supra note 79.
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mediators through the Minneapolis Urban Coalition.8 2
Mediators are hired on the basis of their listening and problemsolving skil~s.3 The Coalition trains mediators at a one-day
workshop and instructs them to take a peace-maker approach
and to remain neutral. Compromise is the focus of the meeting
with the involved parties. During the meeting, the mediator encourages the parties to identify the problem areas in their relationship that have triggered the battering. 84 The couple then
enters into a written agreement. This process is limited to one
hour. Mediators have no authority to impose anything on the
85
parties, and compliance is voluntary.
CDSP contacts the parties three times during the six
months following mediation. The director of CDSP concedes
that when CDSP contacts victims, they do not appear to be
honest about whether the abuse is continuing.8 6 If either party
breaks the agreement, CDSP does nothing unless the victim returns to the prosecutor's office. 87 When victims return, the
Minneapolis City Attorney decides whether to ifie criminal
charges. The Minneapolis City Attorney rarely prosecutes an
abuser when mediation has failed.8 8 If the prosecutor does intervene, charges are fied only for the abuse that broke the
agreement. No charges are ified for the abuse that originally
89
brought the woman into the legal system.
III.

Mediation-An Evaluation

The Minnesota Department of Corrections estimates that
35,000 Minnesota wives are beaten by their husbands each
year.9 0 In over ninety percent of these cases, the husband had
82. Id. The Urban Coalition is a research and advocacy organization that
works on behalf of poor and non-white people. In mediation cases the coalition's primary concern is keeping men of color out of the criminal system. Women are reportedly not part of the coalition's constituency. Telephone
interview with Urban Coalition representative Lou-Ann Nyberg, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct. 7, 1983).
83. Nyberg interview, supra note 82.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Jackson interview, supra note 79.
87. Howard interview, supra note 33.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota Programs for Battered Women, 1981 Update 39 (1981). See also Minneapolis Star and Tribune,
Aug. 28, 1983, at A6, col 1; Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota
Programs for Battered Women, 1983 Update (1983).
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previously abused the wife.9 1 Ninety-three percent of the assaults included sexual abuse, as well as threats, choking, or the
use of guns and knives.92 In spite of this evidence, prosecutors
have consistently preferred to divert domestic abuse cases so
that they are free to pursue "real" criminals. 93 This preference
both illustrates and perpetuates the attitude that wife battering
cases are unimportant and should not be dealt with as criminal
matters. Wife abuse is avoided at every stage within the criminal system, from prosecution and arrest to the judge's sentencing.9 4 When the system does respond to wife abuse cases, it is
heavily weighted in favor of the batterer.9 5
Because of the criminal system's dismal failure to address
wife battery, alternative programs receive praise. No evaluation of mediation programs has yet thoroughly examined the
goals and methods of such programs in light of the causes of
battering. Viewed from such a perspective, mediation programs take on a new and disturbing character.
In theory, mediation programs incorporate the very myths
and biases that have rendered the criminal system ineffective
in battering cases. In other words, mediation programs perpetuate the problems and biases of the criminal system. In mediation, the bias takes on a new and beguiling disguise that
frustrates attempts to eliminate the institutionalized causes of
battering. The disguise is the benign language of "keeping the
family together" and "problem solving."
In practice, mediation programs provide a dumping
ground for unwanted criminal cases. The programs serve to
pacify feminists who demand that society eliminate the inequities in the criminal system. Like a pacifier, mediation programs
provide no real nourishment for those who hunger for equality
before the law. In the final analysis, mediation programs provide a new excuse to avoid the social and fiscal costs of eliminating violence against women.
A.

Mediation'sIdeology

Mediation is designed to create an agreement or contract
between the parties that will lead to the cessation of the behav91. Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota Programs for Battered Women, 1981 Update 39 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Lerman, supra note 4, at 1.
94. See also, Langley & Levy, supra note 13, at 126-85.
95. See generally Lerman, supra note 4.
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ior that brought them into the program. 96 Program literature
for CDSP states that the mediation sessions are designed to
find solutions to problems and to reduce or resolve conflicts existing in the parties' relationship. The literature recommends
that parties "think about what they want from the other party
to the dispute and what they are willing to give in return." 97
This stated purpose of mediation assumes that the parties'
relationship is the problem, that both parties are somewhat at
fault, and that compromise is an appropriate solution. These
assumptions match the discredited theories about the causes of
battering. The problem-solving and compromise approach, for
example, incorporate assumptions from the victim blaming theories. This approach assumes that the victim has done something to provoke the beatings. It assumes that stress or conflict
within the marital relationship caused the problems. 9 8 Assumptions underlying the practice of mediation do not address
the conditions that institutionalize abuse, such as a woman's
isolation in the family, her economic dependence on her husband, and the social system that reinforces the husband's belief
that he has a right to beat his wife.
The problem-solving approach also assumes that helping
the couple remain together and work out their problems is in
the best interest of the woman. Staying together, however, may
not be in the best interest of the woman. One study, for example, shows that the frequency of contact between the batterer
and the victim was the foremost indicator of the frequency of
violence.9 9 This study also found that thirty-six percent of the
victims who had participated in mediation reported increased
concern about their safety; forty-one percent reported increased fear of revenge. 0 0 Keeping the husband and wife together may perpetuate the violence. To the extent that the
primary effect of mediation is to keep the violent family together,1 01 mediation perpetuates violence.
96. Jackson interview, supra note 79.
97. CDSP literature, supra note 77.
98. Lerman, supra note 8, at 86-87.
99. Barbara Smith, Non-Stranger Violence: The Criminal Court's Response
76 (1983).
100. Id. at 71.
101. The director of CDSP denies that the goal of mediation is to keep the
family together. Jackson interview, supra note 79. The Urban Coalition, however, agrees that improving the couple's relationship is the primary goal. Ny-

berg interview, supra note 82. Other mediation facilities across the country
more unabashedly proclaim that they do everything possible to keep families

together. See Under the Rule of Thumb, supra note 16, at 64.
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What constitutes the "best interest" of the battered woman needs re-evaluation. If an ongoing marriage and attendant
economic dependence of the wife on her husband is in the best
interest of the woman, then mediation is effective. But if eliminating the wife's fear of revenge and providing her with safety
is in her best interest, then mediation is inappropriate. The
problem-solving approach of mediation incorporates an assumption regarding women's best interests which ignores the
physical danger women face.
B. Mediation'sMethodology
Mediation may be inappropriate for any family law dispute,10 2 but it is, at best, counterproductive in battering situations. Effective mediation depends on equal bargaining power
between the parties, confidentiality of the negotiation, and neutrality of the mediator. Furthermore, the issues of mediation
must be amenable to compromise.10 3 Mediation methods in
battering cases fail to conform to these requirements.
In a typical battering relationship, the woman does not
have equal bargaining power. She has less economic resources
than the batterer. Furthermore, mediation requires the woman
to be her own advocate. After being physically beaten, she may
not be emotionally able to advocate effectively for herself.o4 A
battered woman needs the built-in protections of the legal system. She needs a lawyer or an experienced advocate to evaluate the ramifications of any proposed solutions and to
compensate for her unequal bargaining position and her probable lack of advocacy experience.1 0 5 Mediation does not offer a
battered woman these protections.
Mediation programs do not always guarantee the confidentiality of mediation negotiations. The mediator may be called
as a witness in a subsequent divorce or child custody proceeding to testify regarding the conversation between the parties
during the session.1 0 6 If the parties know that admissions of
wrongdoing made in a mediation session could be used against
102. Cf. Janet Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and
Problems, 2 Law & Inequality 21 (1984).
103. Unpublished policy paper by the National Center of Women and Family
Law, available from the Center, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, N.Y. 10003
[hereinafter cited as NCWF'LJ.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. But see, Minn. Stat. § 518.167 subd. 1-4 (1982) (amended 1984 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 635 (West)) (Provides that in contested custody proceedings, a
court ordered investigation regarding custodial arrangements for a child may
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them, it is unlikely that they will freely and honestly discuss
their problems. Honest exchange, however, is the necessary
starting point for mediation. Lack of confidentiality inhibits the
effectiveness of mediation.
Another problem with mediation is that mediators are
often biased. 107 Some mediators believe that the woman deserved or provoked the attack. Others think that women who
work outside the home are inadequate wives, or erroneously
assume that the housework is shared equally when the woman
is working.1 08 In addition, some mediators pursue a goal other
than stopping the abuse. The Minneapolis mediation program,
for example, focuses on keeping men of color out of the criminal system. 109 Thus, the woman may face both her husband's
abuse and the mediator's bias.
Methods used to mediate disputes assume that violence is
amenable to compromise. Negotiation means a trade-off. The
woman bargains away her personal safety, and possibly her
life, in exchange for economic security. 110 In the trade-off, the
wife also gains by fulfilling her expected role of promoting familial tranquility. In effect, the process of mediation asks a woman to agree to make dinner ten minutes earlier in exchange
for not being punched or beaten. To prevent such "trade-offs,"
wife abuse cases should not be mediated. There should be no
''compromise" with respect to violence.
Organizations familiar with mediation methods argue that
mediation should not be used for parties in a continuing violent
relationship.Ill Mediation methods are dangerous because
they fail to deter future life-threatening abuse. Not only do mediation methods fail to give swift and sure punishment to abusers they also fail to communicate to the abuser that his conduct
is wrong. Instead, mediation allows the abuser to blame his violent behavior on small things that the woman has done to provoke him. These methods support the notion that the violence
is a result of some defect in the parties' relationship rather
than a defect in the assailant's ability to express his hostility,
frustration, or sexuality in a non-violent way. These methods
not obtain information from a mediator unless both parties have agreed in writ-

ing to the disclosure).

107. NCWFL, supra note 103.

108. Id.
109. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text; see supra note 82.
110. NCWFL, supra note 103, at 2.

111. Id.
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do not counter the assailant's training that women are appropriate objects for violence or that beating women is not a crime.
The privatization aspect of mediation programs also concerns battered women's advocates. As discussed earlier, the
isolation of the battered wife reinforces the husband's power
because it insulates him from the threat of reprisal and simultaneously distorts the wife's perception of reality. 12 The private nature of mediation compounds this problem rather than
alleviates it. The only people involved in the mediation are the
couple and the non-professional mediator.1l3 The mediator has
no authority to impose anything on the couple. Thus, the
power differential between husband and wife remains undisturbed. The batterer remains insulated from the evaluation or
disapproval of others. Moreover, unlike a public trial, the
closed session leaves a mediator's biases undetected and unchecked. As a result, mediation has little impact upon the batterer's perception of the acceptability of his behavior.1 1 4 The
impact upon the wife is more devastating. She learns that turning to the law for help is futile.
C.

Mediation and Administration

Administrative problems also cause mediation programs
to be ineffective. Mediation programs often lack funding, expertise and personnel. For example, CDSP's staff consists of
the program director and one clerical worker. Occasionally, the
program employs two student interns. The CDSP program director personally handles an estimated 250 cases per month.1 1 5
The director is also required to follow up each case. Under
these conditions, the mediation program cannot give each case
the attention it deserves.
Similarly, the Urban Coalition currently provides CDSP
with four mediators. 16 Four mediators cannot carefully handle
the tremendous caseload of CDSP. Mediators' minimal training further jeopardizes the program's effectiveness. In other
programs across the country, mediators generally receive a
maximum training of forty classroom hours.117 In Minneapolis,
112. See supra notes 58-62, 66-68 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
115. Jackson interview, supra note 79.
116. Nyberg interview, supra note 82.
11i. Id. Even a forty hour workshop may not be sufficient, especially if the
training fails to stress that the objective of mediation must be to stop abuse.
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the training consists of a one-day workshop." 8 The physical
safety of battered wives is too important to leave to unskilled
mediators. Even if mediation were an appropriate method of
handling domestic violence, the lack of funding and skilled personnel seriously undermines the effectiveness of these
programs.
D.

Who Benefits From Mediation

Underlying the benign language of problem-solving and
compromise are several hidden societal interests. A cursory
look at these interests exposes the paternalistic bias against
women inherent in the mediation system. The fact that this
bias mirrors the societal view of women cannot save mediation;
repetition of injustice does not legitimize it.
Mediation advocates argue that a major benefit of mediation is that it recognizes the wife's economic dependence on
the husband. 1 9 Some mediation advocates argue that the wife
is better off if she stays with her husband because he will support her.120 The wife acts in her own economic interest if she
remains with her husband. Other mediation advocates argue
that the wife should stay with her husband so that she will not
go on welfare and be a burden to the state.121
These economic concerns must be considered in light of
the causes of battering. As previously discussed, the wife's
economic dependence on the husband is a major contributing
cause of battering. 22 The husband knows that his wife does
not have the economic means to survive without him. The
wife's continued economic dependence on the husband only
serves to reinforce this destructive cycle of violence. The fact
that advocates of mediation recognize and promote the wife's
economic dependence on her husband oppresses rather than
benefits the battered wife.
Society also has a hidden interest in using the wife as a
"buffer" between the husband's violence and the rest of society. Prosecutors and judges may refuse to act in domestic violence cases because the husband is not a threat to anyone but
his wife. 123 This reasoning parallels the reasoning underlying
118. Id.

119. Jackson interview, supra note 79.
120. Id.
121. Interviews with prosecutors in Minneapolis, Minnesota (June, 1982-August, 1983).
122. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
123. See Armstrong, supra note 1, at 5.
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the catharsis theory. Both this reasoning and the theory assume that aggression expressed through violence is inevitable. 2 4 Both assume husbands require an outlet for their
aggression, and that wives can provide an outlet for husbands.
The battered wife serves two needs. First, she fulfills her
wifely duty of easing her husband's frustrations., Second, the
wife provides a major benefit to the rest of society. The husband will not be violent toward other members of society when
he satisfies his need to be violent in the privacy of his home. 125
The catharsis theory is entirely unsupported by scientific
data and has been discredited by recent studies.126 Even if the
catharsis theory were correct, prosecutors and judges should
not justify their failure to protect wives and their refusal to
punish husbands for abusive behavior simply because violence
is inevitable. As one author states:
[I~f it is acceptable to us that [the wife] is there to domesticate [the husband's] violence, if in doing so she is a soldier enlisted for society's protection-then it seems unkind
in the extreme to disown her, wounded.127
To assume wives should be sacrificial lambs for society is
to degrade and dehumanize women. Mediation programs operate on these assumptions. They protect husbands from sanctions and fail to protect wives. By serving as a means to
decriminalize battery, mediation programs incorporate the dehumanizing assumption that wives exist to domesticate their
husband's violence.
E. Protecting Men of Color
To the extent that battering affects women of color the
problem becomes more complex. Some women of color may be
reluctant to report incidents of battering because of discrimination against men of color in the criminal system. Women of
color face the dual problems of racism and sexism. When women of color speak out against the injustices that men of color
perpetrate upon them, they run the risk of dividing the movement to eliminate racism. 128 But in remaining silent about
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
Armstrong, supra note 1, at 5-6.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
Armstrong, supra note 1, at 6.

128. A complete examination of race/class interaction is beyond the scope of
this article. For a discussion of the dual problems, see Angela Davis, Race,
Class, and Sex (1982); The Men Are All Black, The Women Are All White, But
Some of Us Are Brave (Gloria Hull and Barbara Smith eds. 1983); Scheffier interview, supra note 50. Scheffier explains that some women of color believe
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such abuse, women of color subordinate their own special
cause to the cause that they share with men of color. Some women of color die for the sake of such chivalry.1 2 9 This dilemma
is compounded by the protectionist approach taken by some
mediation programs.
Protecting the interests of men of color is a somewhat unknown although expressed function of mediation. Both representatives of CDSP and Urban Coalition agree that a primary
concern of mediation is to keep men of color out of the criminal
system. 130 Their concern is twofold. First, they assume that
men of color with unemployment problems will encounter increased unemployability if they are subjected to criminal
charges. Second, these representatives claim that relations between police and men of color would further disintegrate if police made more arrests in domestic cases.131 These are
legitimate and pressing concerns. The question is whether
these interests should be the primary focus in a program meant
to protect battered women.
Those who advocate for mediation to protect men of color
from the criminal system overlook some important factors. The
that because their culture has been repeatedly attacked, they must view themselves as part of a whole and that individual interests are, by necessity,
subordinate to the rights of the whole. She argues that for society to respond
effectively to battering in communities of color, society must work with women
as part of a whole community.
129. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
130. Nyberg interview, supra note 82.
I don't agree with mandatory arrest because victims can use it for
their own advantage. Just because the woman tells the officer he
did it, they are going to get the guy. She can use it when she is
mad at her boyfriend. Minority men are overrepresented in the
criminal justice system. We do not want that person to get a criminal record.
Jackson interview, upra note 79. Other mediation programs make similar efforts to keep men of color out of the criminal justice system. See Under the
Rule of Thumb, supra note 16, at 64. Evidence contradicts Jackson's view that
wives are liars and manipulators out for vengeance. People have used similar
arguments to avoid prosecution of rape and sexual harassment. This myth continues despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. See generally, Russell & Van de Ven, supra note 416; Diana Russell, Rape in Marriage (1982);
Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979); Susan
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975). Women have
silently endured batterings to protect their husband's careers, they have been
victimized in the workplace without complaint to protect their own jobs, and
they have silently endured brutal rapes to avoid social stigma and their own
crucifixion at trial. Only one out of five abused women seek assistance. Minn.
Dep't of Corrections: Program for Battered Women, Data Summary Report
(1982). The belief that wives will use the criminal system to their advantage
only demonstrates the severity of the bias against women.
131. Jackson interview, supra note 79; Nyberg interview, supra note 82.
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difference between police investigation of domestic violence
and police investigation of many other crimes is one overlooked
factor. When an arrest takes place outside the home, there is
always the risk that the police initiated the contact as a result
of prejudice. In contrast, domestic abuse arrests typically occur within the couple's own home. Police usually do not initiate the contact with the man arrested in domestic abuse cases.
It is only when the wife, or a neighbor who hears her screams,
calls the police, that the husband is subjected to any risk of ar13 2
rest or prosecution.
Another overlooked factor is the relative inequality between men and women of color. In domestic abuse cases, the
man of color initially has a significant degree of control over his
entrance into the criminal system. If he stops beating his wife,
he will not be in contact with the criminal system. Once the
man of color enters the criminal system, he will most likely be
subjected to the racial abuses that characterize our criminal
system. The batterer, however, always has some initial control
over his victimization through his voluntary conduct. The battered wife, however, is often not powerful enough to stop her
husband's abuse.1 33 Since the batterer, not the victim, has control over the abuse, the emphasis in mediation on protecting
the batterer from the criminal justice system rather than protecting the victim from the batterer is misplaced.
Comparing domestic abuse to other crimes reveals other
overlooked factors in evaluating mediation programs. The concern for protecting men of color from the criminal system does
not manifest itself in the decriminalization of acts outside the
family context. No one would suggest that if a man of color
robs a bank, the protection of his career should be the primary
focus of the criminal system's response. Nor would anyone
suggest that the offender enter into an unenforceable contract
providing that if society makes given concessions, the offender
will not rob banks any more. That our system advocates this
approach only when women are the victims of crime exposes
the depth of misogyny in our culture.
Some advocates of mediation argue that family violence
deserves different treatment from other criminal behavior because of its interpersonal nature. Battered women's advocates
132. A mandatory arrest project in Duluth, Minnesota resulted in more arrests of whites and middle-class offenders, but did not result in more arrests of
men of color. See supra note 48.
133. See, e.g., supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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and counselors of batterers, however, agree that battering is
not the result of a dysfunctional relationship. 134 Since the
causes of battering are not linked to problems in a particular
relationship, it is irrational that the criminal system's solution
to battering is linked to the particular interpersonal nature of a
husband-wife relationship.
A program that represents itself to society and victims as
a program to stop battering and simultaneously makes the welfare of the husband/batterer the program's primary concern is
at best misleading. Securing the wife's safety and protecting
the batterer's career are often conflicting goals. Unless this
conflict is discussed with the victim, she will have misconceptions about mediation. Some victims believe that their safety is
the primary goal of the program.1 35 Victims sometimes erroneously assume that the mediator will take their side against the
victims' husbands. As one woman of color who unsuccessfully
participated in mediation remarked: "That whole system was
set up to protect him [the batterer]. I feel badly about the way
minority men are treated, but that doesn't mean that I deserve
to be the scapegoat." 3 6 If mediators revealed to the victims the
true focus of the program, many would probably not agree to
participate.
Eliminating racism in the criminal system is important.
Absolving men of color from responsibility for criminal acts
against women, however, is an inappropriate means to achieve
that end. The solution lies in reforming the criminal system
and holding it accountable for racial abuse, not in decriminalizing violent acts. The sexism that prompts some people to sacrifice the physical well-being and the lives of women of color in
order to end racism is as repugnant as the racism itself.
134. Andrew McCormick, one of the developers of "Emerge," a model domestic abuse program in Boston, stated: "Our basic premise is that the cause of
abuse is the fact that men dominate women both in personal relationships and
1Over the centuries [this) has given men permisin social institutions ....
sion to beat their wives." McCormick also criticizes male socialization which
teaches men to dominate and fails to provide men with non-violent ways of
handling emotions and conflict. He believes that "real prevention [of domestic
abuse] lies in changing social norms that give men permission to be abusive
and controlling." Zak Mettger, Response to Fain. Violence, Dec. 1982, at 1-2
(quoting Andrew McCormick).
135. Howard interview, supra note 33.
136. Interview with battered woman in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Nov. 10,

1983).
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Alternatives to Mediation

Mediation may actually perpetuate battering by protecting
the batterer from criminal sanctions. This protection reinforces
the husband's belief in his right to beat his wife, it absolves
him of blame for his actions, and insulates him from social
stigma. Mediation allows the husband to negotiate a change in
his wife's behavior and fails to send a message to the batterer
that he is responsible for his conduct and that his conduct is
wrong.
Mediation programs derived from victim blaming theories
incorporate serious flaws of the criminal system. Mediation
does not address the actual causes of battering. Mediation simply adopts a "stay together and compromise" attitude which reinforces the husband/wife power differential and the husband's
belief in his right to beat his wife.
Wife battering is criminal behavior. The fact that it occurs
in a family setting does not change its criminal character. A
criminal court is the proper forum for dealing with wife battering. Despite the problems that plague the criminal system,
the solution to battering is not to decriminalize it. Instead, reforms must be made in both the social structure that institutionalizes violence against women and the criminal system that
refuses to punish this violence.
Many possible reforms would make the criminal system
more effective. Police officers must be educated about the
causes of battering. They must be trained and required to
make arrests when they have probable cause to believe that a
husband has assaulted his wife. Prosecutors can require the
police rather than the victim to file the complaint against the
batterer. At the minimum, prosecutors should encourage victims to press charges. In addition, prosecutors should use the
same criteria for charging domestic assaults as they use for
other assaults. Where prosecutors have discriminatory charging practices, they should not be immune from legal action.
Furthermore, prosecutors should routinely issue contempt citations for assaulters who violate protection orders. 137 Like the
police and prosecutors, judges need to be educated about battering. Judges should impose sentences in domestic abuse
137. Battered women often feel that their orders for protection are useless
because they are not enforced. Interviews with battered women in Minneapolis, Minnesota (June, 1982-August, 1983). In my experience at the Minneapolis
City Attorney's office, contempt citations were never issued for violation of protection orders.
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-cases that reflect the seriousness of the crime. Finally, police,
woprosecutors and judges should cooperate with battered
38
programs.
treatment
batterer
and
men's advocates
A societal recognition of all women and men of color as
valuable members of society must accompany these reforms.
As a society, we must give up the economic and psychological
benefits we receive from subordinating whole classes of people.
Only when sexism and racism cease to dominate social policy
can reforms be truly effective. Until then, we must work to
eliminate obstacles to reform. Mediation and its method of
sheltering and nurturing sexism is one of those obstacles. Discontinuing mediation of wife battering cases will eliminate one
discriminatory practice and make possible other substantive
societal reforms to achieve equality for all people under the
law.
138. For a discussion of these reforms, see generally Lerman, supra note 4,
at 13-32; Schechter, supra note 2, at 157-84 Pastoor, supra note 76, at 603-07.

